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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite sharing a common culture over thousands of years, the modern stance of the Chinese 
and Taiwanese governments relating to the separation of powers and human rights has taken a 
drastically different path over the past seven decades. This paper begins with a brief 
introduction to traditional Chinese jurisprudence and how it has been shaped in recent times 
by the emergence of Western legal principles.  
 
It further examines the correlation between the separation of powers and the diversity of 
political discussion and level of regulation in the media of the People‟s Republic of China 
(„PRC‟ or „China‟) and the Taiwanese Republic of China („ROC‟ or „Taiwan‟), and how the 
constitutional and legislative provisions of each address these concepts and how they reflect 
international treaties adopted by each government. The emergence of online media to further 
demonstrate the different stances taken by the PRC and ROC on the adoption of these 
Western principles is analysed. Finally, the paper will examine the international criticisms the 
PRC and ROC face for their practices regarding media censorship.  
 
The paper suggests that maintaining a separation of powers is crucial in order to uphold a 
free, independent press. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To gain an understanding of the 
purpose and effect of media laws in the PRC 
and the ROC, it is essential to first provide a 
brief overview of the cultural context in 
which these laws, and the legal systems of 
these governments as a whole, has 
developed. 
Traditional Chinese legal philosophy 
differs vastly from that of the West. Unlike 
the Roman-derived legal systems of the 
West, the Chinese legal system had for 
centuries operated as a state-centered entity. 
There existed little regard for the human 
rights, judicial independence and equality 
before the law that has become the staple of 
Western democracy.
1
 
The traditional Chinese legal system 
has been influenced by two major 
competing, and occasionally compromising, 
legal ideologies. The first is Confucianism, 
which was developed in the Spring and 
                                                          
1
 Kwan, Angela, „Is Confucius to blame? Chinese 
culture and the conception of the rule of law in the 
two Chinas‟ (2004) 13 (3) Polemic 15-22, 16. 
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Autumn period of ancient China (771-476 
BCE). It draws on the teachings of the 
ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius. This 
school of thought operated on the basis that 
human nature was objectively good, and that 
legal disputes were to be solved through 
compromise to preserve harmony in 
society.
2
 There was little need for public 
legal institutions and little emphasis was 
placed on the procedural formality and 
codification of law that is commonly 
considered an element of the rule of law in 
the West.
3
 
The second school of thought, Chinese 
Legalism, developed later in Chinese history 
during the Warring States period (475-221 
BCE).
4
 This ideology saw law as a means of 
ensuring citizens complied with the will of 
the state. This was to be done through 
rewarding loyalty, and enforcing strict 
punishments for acts against the state.
5
 This 
placed the governing elite of the state above 
the law, violating the rule of law principle 
that all are equal before the law. 
While Chinese law is similar to 
Western law in the sense that it does not 
explicitly derive from religion, there are 
dissimilarities between the two.
6
 This means 
there are inherent difficulties in the 
                                                          
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Zhao Jun, „Mutual Encouragement and Interaction 
of International Rule of Law and China‟s Rule of 
Law‟ (Speech delivered at Guanghua Law School, 
Hangzhou, 12 January 2017). 
4
 Kwan, Angela, above n 1, 16. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World 
(Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2004) 302-5. 
importation of Western legal doctrines, such 
as the separation of powers and Western 
perceptions of human rights, into a Chinese 
cultural context. Chinese law is built upon 
thousands of years of tradition, and operates 
in such a manner as to persuade those 
subjected to it to comply through balance 
and compromise. This differs from the 
obligatory attitude of the positive, codified 
legal traditions in the West.
7
 Chinese law is 
based around what is culturally deemed as 
„right‟ from a traditional intrinsic 
standpoint, and not from a written law 
issued by a designated positive law-making 
body. This has sparked much academic 
discussion around what is referred to as the 
Asian values debate, a notion that the 
traditional culture of Asian societies justifies 
to a certain extent the imposition of 
autocratic governments.
8
 
In the Western sense, Chinese 
traditional legal theory considerably lacked 
what Walker claims is constitutionalism.
9
 
Under Walker‟s theory, constitutionalism 
refers to the measures taken in a society‟s 
law to prevent any individual or entity from 
wielding absolute power. Constitutionalism 
thus entails „not individual rights but 
                                                          
7
 Ibid, 302. 
8
 Michael C. Davis, „Constitutionalism and Political 
Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and Asian 
Values‟ (1998) 11 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
109-147, 113. 
9
 Son, Bui Ngoc, „Confucian constitutionalism: 
classical foundations‟ (2012) 37 Australian Journal 
of Legal Philosophy 61-98, 64, citing Graham 
Walker, 'The Idea of Nonliberal Constitutionalism' 
in Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (ed) Nomos 
XXXIX: Ethnicity and Group Rights (1997) 161-62. 
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fettered power‟. The law was a tool to carry 
out the will of the state rather than 
preventing the arbitrary wielding of power.
10
 
Furthermore, the lack of codification 
suggests that the Chinese legal tradition 
lacks common rule of law aspects, including 
transparency, predictability and equal access 
to due process before the law. 
On the other side of the argument, 
however, it is argued that, although not 
codified, the governing authority of a 
Confucian society is still prohibited from the 
arbitrary wielding of power.
11
 Wejen Chang 
argues that, although the obligations of the 
state are not codified in the Western sense, 
Confucian philosophy still holds that order 
and morality are to be preserved in a society. 
Under this doctrine, it is the responsibility of 
the governing body to maintain a social 
environment in which basic human rights 
are preserved. The role of the law and the 
state therefore is to ensure that society at 
large remains harmonious to ensure 
prosperity for its citizens.
12
 This view, 
however, is arguably unrealised absolutely 
in a traditional Chinese society which is in 
part influenced by legalist ideals. While both 
Confucianism and legalism promote social 
harmony, a legalist approach does not 
consider the moral standard inherent in 
Confucian philosophy. Thus, while the 
largely Confucian Chinese legal philosophy 
                                                          
10
 Ibid. 
11
 H. Patrick Glenn, above n 6, 115, 
12
 Ibid. 
complies with constitutionalism, there exists 
the potential for a legalist head of state to 
abuse this authority. 
It is evident from this that the 
differences in Chinese and Western 
traditional cultures has seen each society 
employ the law in vastly varying manners to 
pursue their respective aims. While Western 
notions of the rule of law, liberalism and 
individualism have shaped the development 
of much of Europe‟s laws from the 
Enlightenment onwards, traditional Chinese 
culture has placed the preservation of 
familial and communal harmony as the 
paramount priority in society and the 
preservation of social unity as the law‟s 
main objective.
13
 This contrast is evident in 
the Chinese attitudes towards the separation 
of powers doctrine and stance on human 
rights, particularly the right to freedom of 
speech and publication. A comparative 
examination of both China and Taiwan 
provide an insight into the influence that the 
acceptance – or rejection – of these Western 
values has had in the formation of these 
modern Asian legal systems. 
 
II. LEGAL MATERIALS AND 
METHODS 
Legal materials used in this research 
consist of primary legal material and 
secondary legal materials. Primary legal 
materials include relevant cases as well as 
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international and national regulations on 
subject matter. Since this research compares 
China‟s and Taiwanesse Laws, thus both 
national laws relating to state‟s power in 
controlling media as well as censorship, are 
used as legal basis. International convention, 
that is International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights is also used as primary legal 
materials in this research. 
Secondary materials includes journal 
articles with relevant topic of discussions 
and other relevant sources. The research 
begins with the discussions of each state‟s 
constitutions relating to state‟s control in 
media, tyhen comparasion is drawan. The 
analyses of international convention is also 
conducted to analyse consistency between 
international and national regulations. At the 
end, the international criticisms the PRC and 
ROC face for their practices regarding 
media censorship are examined. 
 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
1.  Separation of Powers in The PRC 
and ROC  
The history of China‟s legal structure 
shows a lack of any notion of separation of 
powers or checks and balances.
14
 Although 
there existed magistrates to apply the laws in 
traditional China, the office these 
magistrates held was of a combined 
administrative and judicial nature. 
Furthermore, while the magistrates were to 
                                                          
14
 H. Patrick Glenn, above n 6, 307-8. 
apply the law, they were granted no 
interpretive freedom. Any issues involving 
the interpretation of the codes in question 
was to be dealt with by the government, 
with magistrates exposing themselves to 
administrative or criminal sanction if they 
erred from this.
15
 Thus, it is evident that 
China lacked any form of judicial 
independence, with the judiciary in China 
being held accountable to the government, 
whose interests its rulings were expected to 
uphold.
16
 
This is a trend that has continued up to 
the present in modern mainland China. The 
Communist Party of China („CCP‟) has 
flatly outlined its views that the separation 
of powers is incompatible with Chinese 
culture and society. In 1987, Deng 
Xiaoping, then Chairman of the Military 
Commission and the chief policy-maker in 
China, stated that China would reject the 
Western notion of the separation of powers. 
This was reiterated again in 2011 by Wu 
Bangguo, Chairman of the National 
People‟s Congress (NPC) and a member of 
the Political Bureau (politburo) Standing 
Committee.
17
 This seems to suggest that 
there exists a dichotomy between Western 
legal traditions and Eastern culture, although 
it raises the question of how the Taiwanese 
government has, after a period of arbitrary 
                                                          
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Qian Gang, The Power of Separation (2017) China 
Media Project: A project of Journalism and Media 
Studies at the University of Hong Kong < 
http://cmp.hku.hk/2012/09/24/27418/>  
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rule by the Kuomintang (KMT), managed to 
adopt the Western separation of powers and 
emerge as a democratic government system. 
Taiwan, however, has increasingly 
adopted Western principles into its legal 
system and has emerged from a period of 
authoritarian martial law autocracy to a 
more democratic, transparent and politically 
diverse society despite its common 
traditional background with mainland 
China.
18
 Although the ROC maintained the 
same Constitution after its flight to Taiwan 
in 1949 as it did at the formation of the 
Republic in 1911, judicial independence was 
subverted for several decades. When martial 
law was imposed in May 1949, the authority 
of both the judiciary and the executive arms 
were assumed by the military and the KMT 
operated a regime which involved the 
significant curtailment of civil and political 
rights.
19
 Despite this, however, there was a 
steady shift in authority from military 
tribunals to ordinary courts until martial law 
was eventually lifted in 1987, allowing the 
separate arms of the Taiwanese government 
to operate outside the ambit of the KMT‟s 
emergency powers and more in line with the 
separation of powers provided for in the 
Constitution.
20
 
In 1990, the Constitutional Court of 
Taiwan held, in J.Y. Interpretation 261, that 
                                                          
18
 Michael C. Davis, above n 8, 113. 
19
 Tay-sheng Wang, „The Legal Development of 
Taiwan in the 20
th
 Century: Toward a Liberal and 
Democratic Country‟ (2002) 11 Pacific Rim Law & 
Policy Journal 1-23, 6. 
20
 Ibid, 20. 
the KMT‟s indefinite extension of national 
representatives was unconstitutional. It 
provided that „periodical reelection of 
representatives is crucial for reflection of the 
will of the people and for implementation of 
constitutional democracy‟.21 Although the 
powers exercised under martial law were 
authorized to be exercised indefinitely, they 
did not permit the extension of the national 
representatives‟ terms of service, which is 
limited to six years pursuant to Article 28, 
paragraph 1 of the ROC‟s Constitution.22 
This landmark decision paved the way for a 
more diverse political landscape, 
culminating in the formation of the 
Democratic Progressive Party („DPP‟) in 
1992 and its democratic election to power in 
2000.
23
 
The Taiwanese government is divided 
into five separate arms of government. In 
addition to the traditional Western 
separation of powers into the three arms of 
executive, legislature and judiciary, the 
Taiwanese government also comprises an 
Examination Yuan and Control Yuan. 
Despite this, it still holds the principles of 
inter-governmental accountability and 
judicial independence at its heart.
24
 
 
                                                          
21釋字第 261 號 [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
261] [1990]. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Freedom House, „Freedom in the World 2017: 
Taiwan Profile‟ < 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2017/taiwan > 
24
 Ibid. 
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Media in The PRC and ROC  
By 1949 there existed two 
governments proclaiming to be the true 
China. Both the Republic of China, 
established in 1911 and forced to resettle on 
the island of Taiwan in 1949, and the 
People‟s Republic of China, which 
established a Chinese communist rule from 
Beijing in 1949, had starkly contrasting 
views on what ideals were to be adopted 
from the West. This is evident in each 
China‟s attitudes towards the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, which has had 
considerable influence on each 
government‟s stance on media regulation. 
The media in the People‟s Republic of 
China has been closely monitored from the 
time the government was founded. 
Particularly during the Cultural Revolution 
of 1966-76, Maoist ideals dominated the 
state‟s perception of the role of the media. 
The view of the government was that the 
media was an instrument to promote the 
interests of the state rather than inform the 
population.
25
 
For a short-lived period in the late 
1970s, there existed a period of greater 
media liberty. Private media was granted 
greater scope to publish political materials. 
This changed again in 1980 when Deng 
Xiaoping announced that the four great 
freedoms in the media would be abolished. 
These were the freedom to speak freely, to 
                                                          
25
 John A. Lent, „Freedom of Press in East Asia‟ 
(1981) 3 Human Rights Quarterly 137-49, 137. 
air views publicly, to hold debates and 
freedom to write wall posters.
26
 
Although modern Taiwan has emerged 
into an open and transparent democracy, for 
decades after the Republic of China‟s KMT 
government fled to Taiwan there was 
considerable constraint on the civil liberties 
and human rights of its citizens. The ROC 
on Taiwan („ROCOT‟) operated as a one-
party system like the PRC until, in 1992, the 
Democratic Progressive Party („DPP‟) 
emerged. This gave a platform to the more 
reformist campaigners in Taiwan‟s society, 
and the DPP took power in the 2000 
election.
27
 Having established this cultural 
context in which the media, government and 
individuals interact, it is easier to understand 
the role of the constitutional and legislative 
institutions in place for the regulation of 
both conventional and online media and the 
influences international law has had on this. 
 
2. Legal Provisions and Institutions 
Concerning Press Freedom  
 
Constitutional Provisions on the Right to 
Free Speech in China and Taiwan  
Now that the cultural and legal 
backdrop of both traditional China and the 
Western-influenced modernization of the 
two Chinas has been established, it is clearer 
how human rights are reflected in the laws 
of the PRC and ROC and how the right to 
                                                          
26
 Ibid, 141. 
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freedom of speech operates with respect to 
media independence. Although both China‟s 
and Taiwan‟s constitutions contain 
provisions safeguarding the right to free 
speech for their respective citizens, this 
paper will explore the is a dramatic 
difference in the operation of both in 
practice, which has drastic implications for 
the level of individual expression and 
discourse permitted in each state. 
Both China and Taiwan have formally 
adopted the terms of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). Article 19.2 preserves an 
individual‟s „right to freedom of expression‟ 
whether it be through speech, writing, „or 
any other media of his choice‟.28 This in 
substance mirrors Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(„UDHR‟), which, in its preamble, also 
evinces the object of upholding „freedom of 
speech and belief‟.29 
While the PRC signed the ICCPR on 5 
October 1998, they are yet to ratify it. Thus, 
it has not passed into binding domestic law 
in China.
30
 The ROC has been unable to 
ratify the document. Although it signed it in 
1967, it was excluded from the United 
Nations („UN‟) in 1971 and lacks formal 
recognition from the UN as a state. This 
                                                          
28
 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) 
art 19.2. 
29
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
30
 Human Rights Watch, „China: Ratify key 
international human rights treaty‟ 8 October 2013. 
means that it is unable to formally ratify UN 
treaties.
31
 The Taiwanese government has 
nonetheless implemented the ICCPR 
through the Implementation Act in 2009, 
giving the covenant legal force on a 
domestic level.
32
 Thus, while the PRC has 
officially signed the ICCPR, it has yet to 
ratify and be bound by them while Taiwan, 
who is incapable of ratification, has 
nevertheless assumed the terms of the 
ICCPR through domestic enacting 
legislation. 
Under Article 35, the Constitution of 
the People‟s Republic of China assures that 
all citizens „enjoy freedom of speech, of the 
press, of assembly, of association, of 
procession and of demonstration‟.33 
Furthermore, Article 47 provides for the 
„freedom to engage in scientific research, 
literary and artistic creation and other 
cultural pursuits… in education, science, 
technology, literature, art and other cultural 
work‟.34 
Below, however, the Constitution 
contains provisions that may be used to 
justify the circumvention of this right. 
Article 51 provides that the rights of citizens 
may only be exercised where they do not 
„infringe upon the interests of the State, of 
                                                          
31
 Taiwan Association for Human Rights, „The 
hidden face of Taiwan: Lessons learnt from the 
ICCPR/ICESCR review process‟ April 2013, 9. 
32
 Ibid. 
33 «中华人民共和国宪法» [Constitution of the 
People‟s Republic of China] art 35. 
34 «中华人民共和国宪法» [Constitution of the 
People‟s Republic of China] art 47. 
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society or of the collective, or upon the 
lawful freedoms and rights of other 
citizens‟.35 This provision is imprecise, and 
provides no indication as to what, in 
practice, constitutes an infringement capable 
of justifying the nullification of a citizen‟s 
constitutional right to free speech, and gives 
the Chinese government considerable 
discretion in deciding what should be 
regulated in the press. 
Like China, the Taiwanese 
Constitution contains a provision 
safeguarding a citizen‟s right to free speech. 
This is found in Article 11, which upholds 
the „freedom of speech, teaching, writing, 
and publication‟ in Taiwan.36 Also like 
China, the Taiwanese Constitution provides 
for the potential abridgement of these rights 
by law in instances to „prevent infringement 
upon the freedoms of others, to avert an 
imminent danger, to maintain social order, 
or to promote public welfare‟.37 However, 
given Taiwan‟s more transparent process of 
Constitutional Interpretation, there is much 
less discretion for the Taiwanese 
government to contravene the right to free 
speech as it must first be held accountable to 
                                                          
35 «中华人民共和国宪法» [Constitution of the 
People‟s Republic of China] art 51. 
36 «中華民國憲法» [Constitution of the Republic of 
China] art 11. 
37 «中華民國憲法» [Constitution of the Republic of 
China] art 23. 
the Grand Justices of the Constitutional 
Court, the highest judicial body in Taiwan.
38
 
The Grand Justices of Taiwan have 
shown caution in the past when it has come 
to circumventing the right to free speech in 
favour of other rights. Constitutional 
Interpretation 509 is one of the leading cases 
on the balance between free speech and the 
rights of others.
39
 This interpretation dealt 
with a case involving Articles 310 and 311 
of the Taiwanese Criminal Code when, in 
1996, a magazine alleged the head of the 
Ministry of Transportation at the time, 
Zhao-yang Tsai, embezzled funds to pay for 
private building renovations. Action was 
raised on the grounds of libel against the 
magazine, who counter-argued that the 
Articles were unconstitutional as they 
violated the magazine‟s right to freedom of 
publication under Article 11.
40
 
Ultimately it was decided that the 
Article did not contravene the right to 
freedom of speech. The court found that 
monetary compensation for libel in a civil 
case would be unsatisfactory as „it would be 
tantamount to issuing them a licence to 
defame‟.41 Therefore, a criminal sanction is 
a constitutional means of preserving 
someone‟s right to reputation and freedom 
                                                          
38
 Jeffrey C.F. Li, „The Constitutional Litigation in 
Taiwan‟ (Speech delivered at Soochow 
University, 18 January 2017). 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ibid. 
41釋字第 509 號 [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 
509] [2000]. 
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from defamation, even if it is at the expense 
of another‟s right to free speech. It was 
further held that Article 311, which provides 
defences for the offence of making 
defamatory statements with bona fide intent 
on the grounds of „public interest‟, was valid 
and constitutional.
42
 
Another landmark interpretation 
involving the right to freedom of speech 
emerged from Interpretation No. 689. This 
case involved the stalking by a journalist of 
a person in a public space. The Grand 
Justices found that the provision in question, 
Article 89, Paragraph 2 of the Social Order 
Maintenance Act, was constitutional, 
provided that the press was engaged in 
newsgathering of events that are in the 
public interest.
43
 
These interpretations reflects what is 
referred to by Professor Li-Hui Lu as the 
„two-sided theory‟.44 That is, a balancing act 
between freedom of speech, which is not of 
itself an absolute right, and the right to be 
free from groundless defamation. Professor 
Lu argues that an appropriate balance 
between the right of free speech and the 
right of reputation is that free speech should 
prevail over defamation where the remark in 
issue is true.
45
 This notion shows an 
                                                          
42
 Jeffrey C.F. Li, „The Constitutional Litigation in 
Taiwan‟ (Speech delivered at Soochow 
University Law School, Taipei, 18 January 2017). 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Li-Hui Lu, „An Analysis of the “Two-Sided 
Theory” – A New Perspective of Taiwanese Civil 
Defamation Law‟ (2011) 29 Chun Yuan Financial 
& Economic Law Review 244-302, 255. 
45
 Ibid, 266-7. 
inclination towards the implementation of 
Western ideals of free speech theory. It 
considers that free speech is essential to 
promote an environment in which 
individuals can exchange ideas and 
contribute to the democratic process. 
 
Legislative and Administrative Strategies 
for the Regulation of Media  
China‟s court system does not engage 
in the broad, dominant interpretive and 
applicatory roles that are entrusted upon 
Western courts.
46
 The Chinese government 
instead designates authority to statutorily 
empowered government institutions. 
Decisions are therefore lacking in the 
impartiality and procedural transparency 
that is so crucial to the separation of powers, 
and broad, discretionary legislation is 
provided no platform for challenge in the 
sense that the Constitutional Court provides 
for Taiwan.
47
 
Due to the broad array of media 
platforms, the Chinese government has 
several different bodies for regulating 
media.
48
 The General Administration of 
Press and Publication monitor print 
publication media. The State Administration 
                                                          
46
 Donald C. Clarke, „Empirical Research into the 
Chinese Judicial System‟ in Erik G. Jensen and 
Thomas C. Heller (eds), Beyond Common 
Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of 
Law (Stanford University Press, 2003) 164-192, 
168. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Michael Ting, „The Role of the WTO in Limiting 
China‟s Censorship Policies‟ (2011) 41 Hong 
Kong Law Journal 285-301, 288. 
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of Radio, Film and Television monitor 
broadcast and electronic media, including 
the internet. Both are held accountable to the 
CCP‟s Central Propaganda Department.49 
Thus, the regulation of speech in China is 
upheld by institutions directly accountable 
to the CCP. This allows the CCP to have 
direct influence over the content across all 
platforms of domestic Chinese media, 
limiting the issues published in to only those 
that serve the public interest and 
considerably restraining the media‟s 
potential as a platform of social and political 
discussion as well as censoring access to 
challenging foreign sources. 
As discussed above, the constitutional 
rights of Chinese citizens may be subverted 
if the information is classified as a „state 
secret‟.50 What qualifies as a state secret is 
set out in an open-ended, non-exhaustive 
nature in Article 8 of the 1988 Law on the 
Protection of State Secrets.
51
 The provision 
lists several things, though concludes with 
anything „all other matters classified as state 
secrets by the national State Secrets Bureau‟ 
(SSB).
52
 This imparts unfettered discretion 
on the States Secret Bureau, a government 
                                                          
49
 Ibid. 
50
 «中华人民共和国宪法» [Constitution of the 
People‟s Republic of China] art 53. 
51
 Human Rights in China, „State Secrets: China‟s 
Legal Labyrinth‟ (Report, Human Rights in 
China, 2007), 81-9, 82, citing Law on the 
Protection of State Secrets (People‟s Republic of 
China), National People‟s Congress Standing 
Committee, 5 September 1988. 
52
 Ibid, 81. 
body, to decide whether the right to free 
speech may be circumvented.  
Furthermore, depending on the nature 
of the state secret, the classification of the 
information is decided by the SSB. For 
information involving issues of defence, the 
SSB consults with the Central Military 
Commission, and for other issues it consults 
with the ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Public Security, State Security and any other 
„relevant central organs‟.53 Despite the 
appearance of diversity in the process of 
state secret classification, all organs are 
ultimately accountable to the Communist 
Party of China, presenting the potential to 
eliminate the consideration of any 
alternative and potentially conflicting views. 
Article 20 of the Law on the Protection 
of State Secrets provides that „relevant 
security regulations shall be complied with 
and no state secrets shall be disclosed‟ in 
any publication or broadcast.
54
 Again, these 
security regulations are to be devised at the 
discretion of the SSB as per Article 17.
55
 
This therefore provides that the 
Chinese government has the authority to 
declare any form of publication illegal due 
to the broad, indefinite language of the 
legislation governing what is acceptable for 
publication or not. In addition, the lack of 
judicial independence evinced by Article 
128 of the Constitution of the People‟s 
                                                          
53
 Ibid, 85. 
54
 Ibid, 89. 
55
 Ibid. 
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Republic of China, which holds the courts 
responsible to the NPC and requisite state 
bodies, makes it highly unlikely that any 
court would rule against the government.
56
 
China‟s rejection of the separation of 
powers therefore arguably eliminates the 
opportunity for an independent review of the 
government‟s decisions relating to media 
censorship. 
Taiwan, however, has arguably taken a 
much less restrictive legislative approach to 
its regulation of speech. Freedom Press‟s 
2017 „Freedom in the World‟ report 
awarded Taiwan its highest possible score in 
political rights and civil liberties, which 
examines factors such as the independence 
of the press and the diversity of discourse in 
the media.
57
 While the aim of China‟s 
censorship policies is to ensure that no 
publication contrary to the interests of the 
state may challenge the CCP, the major 
examples of Taiwan‟s legislation curbing 
freedom of speech has been enacted with the 
purpose of preventing unfettered free speech 
from infringing the rights of other citizens. 
When compared with China, 
Taiwanese media regulation covers a much 
narrower scope of information and is much 
more transparent in nature. The direct 
language of legislative provisions and 
                                                          
56
 «中华人民共和国宪法» [Constitution of the 
People‟s Republic of China] art 128. 
57
 Freedom House, „Freedom in the World 2017: 
Taiwan Profile‟ (2017) < 
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world/2017/taiwan > 
implementation of proper process constrains 
much of the governmental discretion that is 
available in China. The Taiwanese media 
can publish materials of a broader public 
interest, and are not confined to issues and 
attitudes aligned with state interests.
58
 
Article 310 of the Criminal Code, the 
law challenged in the abovementioned 
Constitutional Interpretation No. 509, 
provides an example of where the state has 
deemed it appropriate to constrain freedom 
of speech where it infringes the right to 
reputation.
59
 
It is thus discernible that, given the 
trend in Constitutional Interpretations and 
the language of the legislation on libel and 
constraints on free speech, that Taiwanese 
law places considerable emphasis on the 
„public interest‟.60 This aligns with the self-
government theory of free speech. It 
promotes true and relevant free speech on 
the basis that it facilitates democratic 
discussion and social contribution.
61
 
However, it also acknowledges that free 
speech is not absolute, and holds the 
potential to harm other individuals the 
subject of the speech. Thus, an interesting 
balance is struck between the potentially 
conflicting traditional Chinese legal 
philosophy or preserving social and 
communal harmony on the one hand and the 
                                                          
58
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59
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Law School, Taipei, 18 January 2017). 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Li-Hui Lu, above n 44, 256. 
Brawijaya Law Journal Vol.4 No.2 2017  Law and Sustainable Development 
230 
encouragement of democratic political 
involvement on the other. The contrast 
between the stances adopted by the PRC and 
ROC on these issues has become further 
broadened with the emergence of online 
communication and the seemingly limitless 
platform this presents for the distribution of 
information. 
 
3. Response to the Surge of Online 
and Social Media Communication  
Due to the inexpensive cost and 
broadness of internet access and the 
relatively level platform for both author and 
audience, Ritika Patni and Nihal Joseph 
argue that the internet has taken on a 
„democratic character‟.62 This has led to the 
emergence of a new frontier of one- and 
two-way communication platforms and the 
possibility for instant and anonymous 
dissemination of information. This media 
revolution has prompted the governments in 
both China and Taiwan to respond by way 
of implementing new laws and institutions 
to ensure the media continues to function in 
line with each government‟s respective 
ideals. 
In early 2017, China took a further 
step in restricting online access to forbidden 
materials by restricting the use of virtual 
                                                          
62
 Ritika Patni and Nihal Joseph, „WTO 
Ramifications of Internet Censorship: The Google-
China Controversy‟ (2010) 3 NUJS Law Review 
337-363, 338. 
private networks (VPNs).
63
 Under this 
strengthened stance of the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology, VPN 
providers may not lawfully offer their 
services without obtaining prior government 
approval. This is a renewed attempt by the 
Chinese government to prevent people in 
mainland China from accessing online sites 
and information that has been blocked by 
the Chinese government.
64
 
There exists no official elaboration by 
the CCP as to the topics considered 
appropriate for censorship on the internet. 
Furthermore, the Chinese government has 
not released statistics or court data on the 
way these laws are applied. Common topics 
the focus of censorship in the part, however, 
have included religious and political 
materials and materials which promote 
critical thought, as well as pornography and 
defamatory content.
65
 
In November 2016, the Standing 
Committee of the NPC introduced a new 
Cyber Security Law.
66
 This law requires 
internet service providers („ISPs‟) to store 
the data of clients, and obliges them to assist 
authorities in any criminal or administrative 
investigation. It also prohibits the 
distribution online of any information which 
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China Morning Post (online), 23 January 2017, [2]. 
64
 Ibid. 
65
 Ritika Patni and Nihal Joseph, above n 61, 345. 
66
 International Foundation of Journalists, „Strangling 
the Media: China Tightens Its Grip‟ (China Press 
Freedom Report 2016, International Foundation of 
Journalists, 20 January 2017) 44. 
Brawijaya Law Journal Vol.4 No.2 2017  Law and Sustainable Development 
231 
may threaten or challenge socialism and the 
state.
67
 The International Federation of 
Journalists (IFJ) suggests that, by increasing 
the burden on ISPs to censor and remove 
inappropriate content, the government 
reduces its own responsibility for 
censorship. 
Taiwan has no central framework of 
online media regulation.
68
 However, two 
laws act as control mechanisms for internet 
access. First, the Protection of Children and 
Youths Welfare and Rights Act provides for 
the creation of regulations to prevent 
children accessing immoral content online.
69
 
Under Article 46(1) this is to be achieved 
through tracking and filtering the content 
accessible to children, and Article 46(2)-(3), 
internet platform providers are required to 
restrict the type of content that young users 
can access. If this is not complied with, the 
government has the authority to remove the 
immoral content.
70
 The Act defines children 
as those under age 12 and youths as those 
between ages 12 and 18.
71
 
The second mechanism exists in the 
Copyright Act
72
. By virtue of Chapter VI-1, 
ISPs are permitted to suspend their service 
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to those accused of accessing material in 
breach of copyright three or more times.
73
 
Although Taiwan has adopted a much 
more liberal approach to online media, 
concerns as to internet neutrality have still 
emerged even after the establishment of 
democracy in the ROC. In 2013, a Bill was 
proposed to amend the Copyright Act. This 
would have allowed the Taiwanese 
Intellectual Property Office to require ISPs 
to blacklist any peer-to-peer file sharing 
sites that violated copyright laws.
74
 This 
sparked protest amongst those who believed 
the vague and imprecise nature of the 
amendments posed a threat to the freedom 
of online information and internet neutrality 
and the proposal was abandoned.
75
 
Despite these concerns, Taiwan has 
moved to solidify free, impartial press 
online. The importance of a free, neutral 
online media has been a hotly defended 
concept in Taiwan and has been used as a 
point of argument against attempts to 
increase the scope of copyright laws. 
However, it is arguable that, despite this, the 
Protection of Children and Youths Welfare 
and Rights Act evidences the retention of 
aspects of values and morality as a guiding 
principle in the Chinese legal tradition and 
                                                          
73
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74
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 Sutton, Maria, Taiwanese users thwart government 
plans to introduce internet blacklist law (3 June 
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despite the liberal online media atmosphere 
in Taiwan, provides that freedom of the 
press, despite its importance as a 
fundamental right, is not absolute. 
 
4. International Criticisms  
While Taiwan‟s stance on freedom of 
speech has in recent decades grown much 
more aligned with internationally recognised 
human rights practices, China has drawn 
criticism from the global community for 
what seems to be an increasingly tight media 
regulation policy. 
In order to gain entrance into the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
Chinese government has had to adapt its 
censorship policies to suit the criteria of the 
WTO. Michael Ting has argued, however, 
had a limited influence on Chinese policy. 
While the WTO has jurisdiction to influence 
member nations‟ policies with relevance to 
the market and international trade, it has no 
influence when the issue is one of human 
rights.
76
 
Furthermore, while the WTO has a 
Panel for the resolution of disputes, these 
disputes can only be brought forth by 
members of the WTO. Therefore, actions 
cannot be brought forth by internet 
companies, such as Google, whose access to 
the Chinese market has been constrained 
and even restricted by Chinese censorship 
                                                          
76
 Michael Ting, „The Role of the WTO in Limiting 
China‟s Censorship Policies‟ (2011) 41 Hong Kong 
Law Journal 285-301, 285. 
policies.
77
 Thus, for the WTO to intervene 
on China‟s media censorship, it is dependent 
on a separate member nation bringing forth 
an action. Even then, it will only act to 
promote international trade rather than in the 
interest of human rights.
78
 
Patni and Joseph suggest, however, 
that Chinese internet regulation policies 
have the potential to be in breach of the 
WTO‟s General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).
79
 However, the GATS 
only covers sectors which are agreed upon 
by the member nation. Thus, it is perfectly 
within China‟s power to enter the 
agreement, yet exclude its online service 
sector from the terms.
80
 Thus, while China‟s 
policies may draw criticisms from the global 
community, the options to challenge China‟s 
policies in the sphere of international trade 
law are quite limited. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS 
Drawing on the above information, it 
can be said that there is a link between the 
scope of human rights and media 
independence and the existence of the 
separation of powers in a society. While 
both the PRC and ROC are derived from a 
common history dating thousands of years, 
and while both contain provisions in their 
Constitutions regarding basic human rights 
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and the freedom of speech and expression, 
in practice this is realised considerably 
different. 
The government of mainland China is 
of a much more autocratic nature than that 
of Taiwan. While the PRC has maintained 
its one-party system and judicial 
accountability to the CCP, Taiwan has 
shifted away from this to a more democratic, 
transparent system of governance with a 
strong, independent judiciary. This prevents 
the Constitutionality of laws and 
government actions relating to media 
regulation from being impartially and 
independently tested in the PRC. Instead, 
the judiciary is pressured by the one-party 
government to apply laws in line with 
government policy, thus constraining the 
potential for political discussion and debate 
on human rights in the court and leaving a 
judge as merely another issuer of CCP 
policy. 
After a period of democratic 
emergence in the latter half of the 20
th
 
century, Taiwan has become a more 
transparent and democratic society. The 
foundation of the DPP marked the decline of 
the absolute rule of the KMT in Taiwan, and 
saw the acceptance in the Taiwanese 
government of a broader representation of 
political expression. This has been reflected 
in Taiwan‟s media, which is left largely 
unfettered by the state, and is for the most 
part only circumvented to preserve the rights 
of other individuals or the welfare of 
minors. 
The emergence of online 
communication technology has provided a 
forum for further distinction between the 
stances of the PRC and ROC. While the 
PRC has sought to bring the internet within 
the control of the CCP and maintain its 
tight-fisted censorship policy, the ROC has 
embraced this new platform for free 
expression and speech. Despite their 
differences however, both still retain 
elements of their Chinese jurisprudential 
roots with conceptions of collective societal 
morality at the heart of both governments‟ 
respective regulatory stances. 
From here there is a discernible 
connection between the liberty and 
independence of a society‟s media and the 
presence of a separation of powers in its 
laws and institutions. In order to prevent a 
society‟s information from operating as a 
mere mouthpiece of the state, it is 
imperative to ensure that no power may be 
arbitrarily vested in and exercised by any 
one governing body. This facilitates an 
open, transparent media and online culture 
in which ideas and information may be 
exchanged freely that is a staple of any 
modern, vibrant democracy. 
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